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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACK IN THE USA
The aim of the paper is to present the major costs that the US economy has suffered as a 
result of the 9/11 attacks. These costs include: loss of lives and property, losses in market 
capitalization on US exchange. The paper further shows how terrorism affects the budgetary 
decisions of US government (in broader sense the attack led to the attack on Afghanistan 
and Iraq), and also the adjustment costs for industry and economy, that have been taken 
to cover terrorism risk. The results suggest that the economic consequences of terrorist in-
cidents are short term. The change in overall figures was not massive, as the demand and 
investment simply changed the direction from some sectors to the other.
After the attacks of September 11th 2001, few would disagree that terrorism is among 
the greatest of threats to the current security environment. Though the phenomenon 
of terrorism is not new and has been known to human history for hundreds of years, 
its definitions have varied over time and the same event could be described as an 
act of terror or a criminal incident.1 Terrorism takes its origins from multiple factors 
(economic, religious, political, sociological) and also its consequences are complex 
and influence multiple fields of our lives. Research into various aspects of terrorism 
has been prompted by the events of 9/11, and many analyses and studies have been 
performed since then. Terrorism is a complex issue and deserves the attention of 
scientists and governmental agencies. It is no longer a phenomenon that concerns a 
minority, a single nation or territory, but it is a global concern and a proper amount 
of attention needs to be attributed to it.
The aim of this paper is to describe the economic consequences of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001, in the United States, often referred to as the 9/11 at-
tack. 
The economic costs of the attack on the US economy can be described by differ-
ent categories, inter alia by the nature of the consequences (direct or indirect), by the 
time period in which they can be measured, etc. Undoubtedly the easiest to identify 
and measure are the immediate costs of the attack, whereas the lasting effects on some 
branches of industry and business will be difficult to estimate.
In my work I have broken the 9/11 impact on the to US economy into several fields 
that focus on the following issues:
1. Immediate effects of the attack. 
2. Macroeconomic and budgetary resources.
1  B. Hoffman in a “Inside Terrorism” draws attention to the fact that the term ‘terrorism’ was 
used massively during the French revolution and in its first period had positive connotations, 
while on the other hand in the 1930s the word ‘terrorism’ was used to describe actions taken 
by the government against its citizens.
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3. US stock market.
4. Consumer spending and reduced travel.
5. Foreign Direct Investment in the US. 
Immediate Effects of the Attack 
The immediate effects of the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon firstly 
cover the passengers and crew of the hijacked planes, and those who died in the at-
tacked buildings, the death toll reached 2973.2 This is a high number of lost lives and 
it has not happened before3 in history that so many people died simultaneously4 in a 
terrorist attack. Immediate costs of the attack start with $34 billion in insured losses 
(which partly covers the $21.6 billion for buildings and infrastructure), $576 million 
for rebuilding the Pentagon, $11 billion for rescue, clean-up and related costs and $7 
billion for official victim compensation.5 Numerous businesses were closed, Manhat-
tan lost 13 million square feet of office space, and 146,000 jobs and $8, 5 billion in 
wages.6 The loss of the expected earnings of those who died in the WTC is estimated 
at $8.7 billion dollars.7 The property damage is, however, smaller than that caused by 
hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the earthquake in California in 1994.8
Looking at the figures above, one can draw the conclusion that it was New York 
that was hit the most severely as a result of the 9/11 attack.
The US stock markets halted for four business days and stocks fell immediately in 
the re-opening days of the stock market, with the Dow Jones falling 684.81 points on 
re-opening day.9
Less than a week following the attacks the airline industry (already facing econom-
ic difficulties before the attacks) began laying off thousands of employees to avoid 
bankruptcy. The most spectacular redundancies were witnessed in Boeing, maker of 
the jumbo jets, that hit the World Trade Center. Boeing, reacting to the attacks, fired 
2  D.K. Nanto, “9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs.” CSR report RS21937: p. 2.
3  Nevertheless, past terrorist attacks were also responsible for many victims: major terrorist 
campaigns date back to the Jewish Zealots’ struggle against the Roman Empire from 48 AD to 
70 AD; the Hindu Thugs’ attacks against innocent travelers in India from 600 AD to 1836 AD (it 
is estimated that the Thugs may have murdered over eight hundred people a year during their 
twelve-century existence) making them twice as deadly on an annual basis as the modern era 
of terrorism (1968–2006); and the Assassins’ actions against the Christian crusaders in the Middle 
East from 1090 AD to 1956 AD (Hoffman 2006: 82–83).
4  Apart from catastrophic natural disasters that have since then been used to predict the 
costs of potential terrorist attacks.
5  D.K. Nanto, op.cit., pp. 2–3.
6  W.C. Thompson, Jr., “One Year Later The Physical Impact of 9/11 on New York City,” 
New York, 4 September 2002; available from <http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/
reports/impact-9-11-yearlater.pdf. 18.
7  Ibidem, p. 2.
8  G. Mankinen, “The Economic Effect of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment.” Coordinator; 
CSR report RL31617, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31617.pdf. 37.
9  O. Jackson, “The impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the US Economy.” http://www.
journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/OliviaJackson911andUS-Economy.pdf. 2.
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30,000 employees.10 To sum up the US airline sector lost 20% of its value in only 3 
months following the attack.11
The direct costs of the 9/11 attack are fairly easy to assess and leave no place for 
uncertainty in its assessment. It has to be underlined, however, that though these 
figures are vast, the economic impact of the attacks was smaller than initially feared. 
Effective management of crisis and quick response of the US Government, Federal 
Reserve and the Administration of Congress to restore the confidence and maintain 
liquidity helped to halt the recession.12
The Impact on Macroeconomic and Budgetary Resources
When analyzing the impact of the 9/11 attack on the US economy we mustn’t forget 
about the conditions of American economy prior to the attack. It was in March of 2001 
that the first signs of the recession became visible: the rate of unemployment grew, 
while production and consumer investments fell. The American government devised 
a strategy to stimulate the economy. Hence, when analyzing the state of the American 
economy after 9/11 we need to take these signs into consideration.
The numerous data that has been collected since 9/11 indicate that the event did 
not have a vast negative impact on the US economy.13 This mirrors other catastrophic 
events in US history, such as the two World Wars and the period of the Vietnam War. 
In these periods growth trends were visible, which supports the thesis of the economic 
resilience of the US economy in the time of crises. As Olivia Jackson rightly points out, 
“This is not to say that terrorism and wars drive economic growth alone; instead, this 
approach is employed to highlight the fact that, to an extent, a correlation exists.”14
The best indicator of the performance of the economy is the GDP. The forecasts 
for the US GDP at the beginning of 2001 were not very encouraging. Prior to 9/11 the 
estimated GDP for 2001 was 1.6% and 3% for 2002.15 The actual GDP post 9/11 turned 
out to be 1% for 2001 and 2% for 2002. Of course, the decline in the GDP cannot be 
ascribed to 9/11 attack only.
It has been calculated that the direct impact of the 9/11 attack resulted in a loss 
0.05% in the productive assets of the American economy.16
10  http:/www.boeing.com/news/release/2001q3/nr_010918z.html.
11  “The Global Economy After September 11,” World Economic Outlook December 2001, 
25 March 2009. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/03/pdf/chapter2.pdf. 16.
12  Congress enacted a $40 billion emergency package within days following the attacks, 
and shortly was preparing to provide an additional $20 billion in aid to the ailing airline industry 
and $20 billion to the Pentagon. The Federal Reserve injected several hundred million dollars 
into the economy, and cut interest rates an additional three times in the wake of the attacks. 
13  Of course this does not apply to the economy of New York, which was hit the most by 
the attack, as described briefly above.
14  O. Jackson, “The impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the US Economy,” http://www.
journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/OliviaJackson911andUS-Economy.pdf. 2.
15  “Economic forces reshape top players,” ICIS Chemical Business, http://www.icis.com/Ar-
ticles/2001/10/15/149004/economic-forces-reshape-top-players.html.
16  G. Andreopoulous, A. Panayides, “The Macroeconomic Effects of 9/11,” www.cluteinsti-
tute-onlinejournalism.com/PDFs/2004109.pdf.2.
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Table 1. US Economic Growth Rates, selection of data from 1939–2005
(Nominal-Dollar and “Real” Gross Domestic Product)
Year
GDP in Billions
of Nominal Dollars
% Change
GDP in Billions
of Real 2000 
Dollars 
% Change
1939 92.2 7% 950.7 7.8%
1940 101.4 4.10% 1,034.0 9%
1941 126.7 7.25% 1,211.1 17%
1942 161.9 28% 1,435.0 19%
1943 198.6 23% 1,670.9 16%
1944 219.8 8.11% 1,806.0 58%
1945 223.0 2% 1,786.3 –1%
1946 222.3 0% 1,589.4 –11%
1963 617.7 5% 2,834 0.4%
1964 663.6 7% 2,998.0 6.6%
1973 1,382.7 12% 4,341.0 5.6%
1974 1,500.0 0.8% 4,319.6 –1%
2000 9,817.0 6% 9,817.0 0.4%
2001 10,128.0 0.3% 9,890.0 7.1%
2002 10,469.0 6.3% 10,048.0 8.2%
2003 10,960.0 5% 10,301.0 0.3%
2004 11,712.0 5.7% 10,675.0 8.4%
2005 12,455.0 8.6% 11,003.0 4.3%
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Fig. 1. United States GDP Growth Rate
When presenting the influence of the 9/11 attack on fiscal policy we need to ana-
lyze two military actions launched by the American government as a result of the “War 
on Terror” strategy declared by President Bush on the day following the attack.17
17  B. Woodward, “Bush at War,” Pocket Bodes, 2003: 45.
– Annual GDP Growith Adjusted By inﬂ ation
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
www.tradingeconomics.com
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The launch of military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq was bound to have signifi-
cant impact on government expenditures. The figures in table II below show how 
much money was spent on the military campaigns in the years 1998–2005. The in-
crease in spending on military action was also accompanied by a rise in expenditures 
on the security and protection of American borders. For example the spending on 
homeland security increased from $56 billion in 2001 to $99.5 billion in 2005.18
Including the FY2004 Supplemental Request, Defense received $51.7 billion for 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, $130 million in International Assistance 
programs in other countries to combat terrorism and $100.1 billion for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.19
On February 14th, 2005, an $81.9 billion supplemental request for FY2005 (subse-
quently amended to total $82.04 billion) was granted by President Bush.20 Its aim was 
to provide funds for ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the “global 
war on terror” and reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
The costs of the “War on terror” strategy needed extra funds, as the American 
economy was not able to bear the burden of war expenditures. The resources could 
be obtained by a raise in taxes or through increased deficit. The American government 
chose the latter way, which is noticeable when refining the figures in Table III. When 
analyzing the costs of the “War on terror” one needs to mention the calculations made 
by Joseph Stiglitz in his book “The Three Trillion Dollar War.” Together with Linda 
Bilmes, he estimates that the bill for the Iraq war is likely to exceed $3 trillion21 and 
the cost relates only to the United States and ignores costs to the rest of the world, or 
to Iraq. The authors argue that “the long-term burden of paying for the conflicts will 
curtail the country’s ability to tackle other urgent problems (...) The United States will 
be paying the price of Iraq for decades to come. The price tag will be all the greater 
because we tried to ignore the laws of economics -- and the cost will grow the longer 
we remain.”22 It is a strong argument proving the thesis that the costs of “the war on 
terror” are hard to measure, consist of multiple expenditures and above all are likely 
to grow. When performing calculations one needs to bear in mind that the costs to the 
society and economy are not only upfront but also hidden, visible after some period 
of time.
18  B. Hobjin, E. Sager, “What has Homeland Security Cost? An assessment: 2001–2005,” 
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci13-2.pdf.2.
19  “2003 report to congress on combating terrorism,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/in-
foreg/2003_combat_terr.pdf.21.
20  CRS Report for Congress, “FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghani-
stan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32783.pdf. 2.
21  J. Stiglitz and L. Bilmes, “The Three Trillion Dollar War,” 30 September 2009, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece.
22  J. Stiglitz and L. Bilmes, “The Iraq War Will Cost Us $3 Trillion, and Much More,” 
30 September 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/03/07/
AR2008030702846_pf.html.
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Table 2. U.S. Military Expenditures, 1998–2005 (In Millions of Dollars)
Year Military Expenditure Percent Change
1998 274,278 –0.7%
1999 280,969 2.4%
2000 301,697 7.3%
2001 312,743 3.7%
2002 356,720 14.0%
2003 415,223 16.4%
2004 464,676 11.9%
2005 504,638 8.6%
2006 546,018 8.2%
Source: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database
Table 3. Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, 2000–2006
(In Billions of Dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Receipts 3,161.6 3,148.8 2,991.5 3,063.7 3,284.5 3,619.5 3,967.5
Total
Expenditures
3,002.6 3,188.2 3,388.2 3,593.4 3,793.2 4,066.0 4,312.3
Net
Lending
/Borrowing
159.0 –39.3 –396.7 –529.7 –508.7 –446.5 –344.8
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product 
Accounts Table
 
One of the factors influencing the performance of the economy is the price of oil. 
In the past one could notice that the rise in the prices of oil had a serious negative 
effect on the growth of the GDP and on inflation (as experienced, for example, in 
1973–1974 and 1989–1990). Luckily, this was not the case in 2001. The changes in the 
prices of oil depend on multiple factors and the potential rise in the oil prices cannot 
be attributed to the consequences of the terrorist attack or the “war on terror.” 
However, some changes in the prices of oil can be ascribed directly to the attack. 
Immediately following the attack the Nymex (the New York Mercantile Exchange) was 
closed. The prices quoted for transactions on the Nymex are the basis for prices that 
people pay for various commodities, inter alia the oil prices throughout the world. 
Therefore, the closure of the exchange left the market participants in a difficult posi-
tion. The oil industry was massively affected by the temporary incapability to use data 
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from Nymex (it resumed its activity in about a week).23 Fortunately, the quoting of 
prices was shifted to the spot market.
In fact, the September 2001 witnessed a fall in crude oil prices. The price per barrel 
was $23.73, which was a drop from $24.44 in August. The restof 2001 witnessed a fall 
in prices, as the demand for fuel for the airline industry diminished, while simultane-
ously the demand for oil was not high, as the winter of 2001/02 was mild.24
These findings might be surprising, as one might expect that the effects of a terror-
ist attack of such character and scale as the events of 9/11, are bound to cause rapid 
growth in oil prices. It seems that in the case of the 9/11 attack the “fear factor” in 
world oil markets was short–termed. Nevertheless, the terrorist attack of September 
11th raised important questions about what may lie ahead for the supply-and-demand 
factors in setting oil prices and what it could mean for the US. economy.25
The Impact on the US Stock Market
As already mentioned, the US stock market was closed for 4 days after the 9/11 attack. 
At first glance one could expect that the incident would have a detrimental effect on 
the stock market. Fortunately the American stock market has shown extraordinary 
resilience to 9/11 attack, just as it did in the past (for example the 1920 Wall Street 
bombings). The analysis of historical impact of financial crises proves that, after a brief 
period of time, calm returns and the markets return to their performance prior to the 
attack.26 It has been argued that in the case of strenuous situations, it is best for the 
stock exchange to be open and to allow the market to correct itself.27 
Several studies examining the influence of terrorist incidents on US markets have 
been performed.28 These confirm that the markets react on the date when the attack 
takes place but then they quickly recover. In fact, US markets recovered much more 
quickly than other major markets, despite the fact that the direct attack occurred in the 
United States. The quickest recovery occurred in Tokyo’s stock exchange, taking only 
six days to recover, while the US stock market recovered after 13 days. Other stock 
markets took anywhere from 22 days (London) to 107 days (Norway) to become calm 
following the 9/11 attack.29
Nevertheless, the short-term impact of the attack was very troublesome for investors. The 
damage to the communication system of the Bank of New York (IMF, 2001b) (the world’s 
23  Report for Congress, “The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment,” http://
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31617.pdf.21.
24  Ibidem, p. 21.
25  P. Blustein, Internet; Accessed 30 September 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A7943-2004Jun1.html.
26  B. Taylor, “The Historical Impact of Crises on Financial Markets,” http://www.tocqueville.
com/article/show/102.
27  O. Jackson, op.cit., p. 5.
28  G.A. Karolyi and R. Martell, “Terrorism and the stock market,” November 2005, http://
www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2005/2005-19.pdf. Their findings show a statistically 
significant negative stock price reaction of –0.83% on September 11th, 2001, corresponding to an 
average loss of $401 million in firm capitalization.
29  R.B. Johnson and O.M. Nedelescu, “The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets,” 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/05/60 (March 2005) 8, http://www.interna-
tionalmonetaryfund.com/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0560.pdf.
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largest custodian and settlement bank) and also the J.P. Morgan (the clearing bank for gov-
ernment securities) resulted in serious disruptions in trading. Finally, many lives were lost 
in the WTC towers and in consequence many businesses were disabled: the repo market, 
federal fund brokers, and ATM networks.30
Exchange rate expectations were affected by the 9/11 attack, but as in case of 
Stock exchanges, the influence was visible only in the first week after the attack. The 
dollar lost 3 to 4 per cent of its value against the yen and euro, but quickly recovered 
in mid September to the levels prior to the attack.31
Consumer Spending and Reduced Travel 
Consumer confidence is the degree of optimism that consumers feel about the overall 
state of the economy and is an indicator of a positive or negative outlook on the abil-
ity to find and retain jobs.32 If consumer confidence is high, consumers are making 
more purchases, and aiding economic expansion, and vice versa, lower consumer 
confidence causes a contraction of the economy. 
An event of such a scale as the 9/11 attack is bound to change the assessment 
of economic risks, by both consumers and businesses. It was no surprise that US 
consumption fell in the aftermath of the attack. In the first months following the at-
tack, the citizens were less eager to attend cultural events (for example attendance 
in cinemas fell, which resulted in losses to the entertainment business). However, it 
has to be underlined that the mechanism through which a change of confidence af-
fects the macroeconomic situation is not easy to assess, as confidence is not an action 
but rather a feeling, and hence it is difficult to measure.33 Nevertheless, attempts to 
measure the consumer confidence are made. According to a survey performed by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, personal consumption expenditure fell in 2001 against 
2000. On the other hand, personal and disposable income rose. Trends in consumer 
consumption and savings were changing from year to year and hence it is difficult to 
track the link between the 9/11 attack and consumer confidence.34
The above chart presents the short term fall of consumer confidence after 9/11 
attack. The decline in consumer confidence was quickly stopped and the reverse 
growth trend started in mid 2002. The analysis of further trends of consumer confi-
dence shows the volatility of the factor and proves that the highest drop in consumer 
confidence in the last decade was seen at the end of 2008 (which unarguably is at-
tributable to the world economic crises and not terrorist incidents).
30  J.M. Lacker, “Payment System Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following September 
11, 2001.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(5), 2004.
31  “The Global Economy After September 11,” op.cit., p. 28.
32  http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Consumer-Confidence.aspx?Symbol= 
USD.
33  “The Global Economy After September 11,” op.cit., p. 21.
34  Ibidem, p. 24. 
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Fig. 2. United States Consumer Conﬁ dence
Surprisingly, the airline business and insurance companies benefited from the at-
tack in the medium and long-term. The benefits were possible due to the government 
assistance. Immediately after the attack on September 22nd, 2001 the Air Transporta-
tion Safety and System Stabilization Act was issued, which provided the business with 
transportation relief. The help was desperately needed, as the airline industry was 
losing $250 to $300 million dollars a day.35 The Stabilization Act provided $5 billion 
in direct aid to the airlines, and additionally $10 billion in indirect aid was granted, in 
the form of guaranteed loans.36
Another field of research I would like to concentrate on is travel and tourism. The 9/11 at-
tack was a massive blow for the insurance industry. The insured losses covered $34 billion.37 
In light of the scale of the losses help from the government was essential. It was needed, 
however, not to cover the losses themselves (as the industry as a whole was able to absorb 
them), but to spread the risk of potential attacks. The industry was not unwilling to cover 
unlimited losses caused by the terrorist incidents, and the terrorist insurance virtually disap-
peared.
The insurance business was hence supported with TRIA: the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(November 2002). The scope of this paper was to divide the risk of potential terrorist inci-
dent between insurance companies and the government. Initially it was supposed to last for 
3 years, but was extended twice with the expiration date on the last day of 2014. As Olivia 
Jackson points out “the bad news was essentially good news for the insurance industry,”38 
as overall 90% of the listed companies experienced an increase in their earning per share in 
the 3 years following the attack.
Apart from the troubles in the airline industry other businesses such as travel and 
tourism were almost massively hit by the attack. Some of the major US cities that have 
35  M.A. Curci, “Transnational Terrorism’s Affect on the U.S. Economy,” http://www.dtic.mil/
cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424217&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.10 January 2009, p. 4.
36  G. Mankinen, op.cit., p. 35.
37  D.K. Nanto, op.cit., p. 2.
38  O. Jackson, op.cit., p. 8.
Source: Conference Bureau 
www.tradingeconomics.com
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a large part of its business focused on entertainment and tourism, such as like Los 
Angeles, and Las Vegas were facing difficulties as well.39
Cruise bookings in the US fell by 40% and cancellations approached 25% com-
pared with 2000. It was also estimated that the US exports of travel and tourist fell by 
12% in 2001 and 4% in 2002.40
These trends were short-term and though, since the 9/11 attack the airline business 
and tourism have witnessed the sinusoid of profit and loss, these fluctuations can be 
associated with various factors and cannot be attributable to terrorist attacks or threat 
of attacks. It is essential to understand that the industry should maintain flexible struc-
tures to manage the crisis and cooperate with media.41
Foreign Direct Investment in the US 
Foreign investments in the United States have performed quite well in the course 
of years. The 9/11 attack did not cause a massive escape of foreign capital from the 
American economy. Foreign investors justly assumed that the event was rare and also 
believed that the American government would take necessary steps to prevent other 
incidents of this type. 
Foreign Direct Investment fell by 1.25% in 2002 against 2001, which is a minor 
figure given the incident’s type and subsequently witnessed growth in 2003.42
Specialists in International Trade and Finance are of the opinion that terrorism does 
not play an important role in the investor’s decision. For example, Daniel Wagner 
argues that investors are directed not by terror but by the income: “Foreign investor 
sentiment is not always dictated by common sense. The lure of profit and desire to 
establish trade partnerships is often a stronger motivational force than perceived po-
litical risk is a disincentive to invest.”43
This seems to be the case in the US after 9/11. According to the annual report per-
formed by the consulting firm A.T. Kearney, “The FDI Confidence Index,” the United 
States is among the top 5 most attractive FDI locations (this applies to the primary sec-
tors, especially in high technology and computer equipment firms).44 In 2004 the US 
was the largest recipient of FDI in the world, gaining $96 billion, a trend which seems 
to be changing now, as investors tend to move to the other locations (China, India, 
Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Hungary and Poland being of the 7 major beneficiaries of the 
shift in the rankings of light manufacturing).45
It is not surprising that some of the studies assessing the influence of terrorists’ 
activities find links between terrorist events and the FDI. However, the results of the 
39  M.A. Curci, op.cit., p. 15.
40  D.K. Nanto, op.cit., p. 6.
41  N. O’Connor and M.R. Stafford, “A chronological review of the tourism industry’s re-
actions to terrorist attacks, using Bali (2002), London (2005), Madrid (2004) and New York 
(2001) as case studies,” Internet; Accessed 6 September 2008, http://lit.academia.edu/docu-
ments/0008/5814/STAFFORD-MR-EuroCHRIE2008_full_paper_044_1_.docx.pdf.
42  http://www.bea.gov/ 
43  D. Wagner, “The Impact of Terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment,” http://www.irmi.
com/expert/articles/2006/wagner02.aspx.
44  A.T. Kearney, Annual publication, “The FDI Confidence Index,” http://www.atkearney.
ro/pdf/fdici_2005.pdf.
45  Ibidem.
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most recent studies are opposite and put more emphasis on macroeconomic fac-
tors.46
For example, the 2005 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress47 does 
not even use terrorism as a factor of analysis. The report ascertains that “...the U.S. 
economy remains a prime destination for foreign direct investment ...and foreign 
direct investment will likely increase as new investments are attracted to the United 
States and existing firms are encouraged to reinvest profits in their US operations.”
Fig. 3. Foreign owned assets in the United States, excluding ﬁ nancial derivatives
Source: http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/table1.xls
Conclusion 
This paper briefly highlights the immediate costs of the 9/11 attack and refers to some 
areas of business that have been affected by the attack. It also shows how terrorism 
affected the budgetary decisions of the US government, taken to prevent terrorist at-
tacks and fight terrorism. 
As Robert Shapiro has explained, “Large economies can roll with occasional acts 
of destructive terror because their modern markets quickly relocate capital and jobs to 
wherever they can be used relatively productively. Size matters, too. Even the largest 
conventional terrorist strike wouldn’t capsize our $10 trillion economy.”48 
In this paper I argue that the effects of the 9/11 attack to the American economy 
are not massive. Demand and investment simply changed direction from some sec-
tors to others; hence we have not noticed a change in overall figures. The American 
economy has shown extraordinary resilience to the attack, just as it has in past times 
of crisis. Nevertheless, the consequences of the effect are visible and we must not 
46  D. Wagner, op.cit.
47  J.K. Jackson, “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: An Economic Analysis,” 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109490.pdf, CRS report, RS21857.
48  R. Shapiro, “Al-Qaida and the GDP. How much would terrorism damage the U.S. econ-
omy? Less than you’d expect.” ttp://www.slate.com/id/2079298//Copyright 2008 Washington 
post. Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC. 
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forget that many factors are not easy to assess, such as symbolic losses and emotional 
consequences which are immeasurable. The consequences of political decisions taken 
to wage “war on terror” may be seen in the future, such as the debt raised by the 
American government to finance the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, whichnthe USA will 
be paying for decades to come. As Joseph Stiglitz points out, the long-term costs of the 
conflict shall diminish the country’s ability to cope with urgent problems.49
Unfortunately, though the immediate and short-term costs of 9/11 attack on the 
US economy have been calculated,50 the future costs of the “war on terror” and other 
steps taken to prevent terrorist attacks have not been measured. Hence, I argue that 
it is even more important now to find ways to identify the economic consequences of 
terrorism. Insight into the correlations between various fields of the economy will arm 
businesses and the US government with the tools that would, in the most optimal way, 
ensure economic growth and stability for American citizens and the USA.
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